Theoretical Issues with New Actors and Emergent Modes of Labour Regulation by Legault, Marie-Josée & Bellemare, Guy
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Theoretical Issues with New Actors and Emergent Modes of Labour Regulation"
 
Marie-Josée Legault et Guy Bellemare
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 63, n° 4, 2008, p. 742-768.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/019545ar
DOI: 10.7202/019545ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 10 février 2017 09:54
742 © RI/IR, 2008, vol. 63, no 4 — ISSN 0034-379X
Theoretical Issues with New Actors 
and Emergent Modes of Labour 
Regulation
MARIE-JOSÉE LEGAULT
GUY BELLEMARE1
As the global economy undergoes a major transformation, the 
inadequacy of labour relations theories dating back to Fordism, 
especially the systemic analysis model (Dunlop, 1958) and the 
strategic model (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986), in which 
only three actors—union, employer and State—share the stage is 
becoming increasingly obvious. A good example is provided by 
companies offering information technology services to businesses, 
where new means of regulation emerge and illustrate the need to 
incorporate new actors and new issues if we are to account for 
its contemporary complexity. A survey of 88 professionals has 
revealed regulation practices that call into question the traditional 
boundaries of the industrial relations system from two points of 
view: that of the three main actors, by bringing the customer and 
work teams onto the stage, and that of the distinction between the 
contexts and the system itself.
In view of the widespread transformations affecting the world economy 
(Coutu and Murray, 2005), observers are increasingly noting the inadequacy 
of efforts, dating back to Fordism, to theorize industrial relations, 
particularly the systems model (Dunlop, 1958) and the strategic model 
(Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986). These models feature only three
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actors: unions, employers, and the government, which interact primarily 
within the framework of the Nation-State:
[Translation] [A structurationist approach to industrial relations] allows us 
to recognize the potential fluidity or plasticity of institutions, particularly 
during times of major social transformations. In industrial relations, one could 
hypothesize that the Fordist (or Keynesian) crisis and the attempts to break free 
from these regulations in a fast-paced era of globalization, is one such episode of 
major transformation. That is why we think it is justified to study the boundaries 
between industrial relations systems or the social practices that contribute, on a 
small or large scale, to their systemization (Bellemare and Briand, 2006: 11).
In a context where new emergent actors are making a significant impact 
on industrial relations, business-to-business (B2B) technology services 
companies (B2BTSC) are good subjects to study regarding emergent modes 
of the regulation of labour because of their extensive exposure to international 
competition on the product and international labour markets. As part of the 
knowledge economy, they hire highly qualified information technology 
professionals. The study of work-life balance (WLB) in this segment of the 
labour market sheds light on the wider canvas of industrial relations and human 
resource management (HRM) practices in the so-called “new economy.”
Given that modes of regulation are emerging from these situations, 
new actors and new issues should be integrated into theoretical
models of industrial relations (IR) systems if their current complexities 
are to be explained. This article re-examines the classical identification 
of IR actors and illustrates its flaws with the case of the B2B sector in the 
Montreal Area. To demonstrate the presence of actors who are as important
as they are unrecognized in the IR system of this branch of industry, we adopt 
Bellemare’s (2000) definition of the IR actor and discuss how it impacts the 
definition of the boundaries of IR systems. The case study of the B2BTSC 
is used here as an example that supports the relevance of a wider theoretical 
framework in progress rather than developed. This example is used as part 
of a plea for a theoretical renewal and in that way of reasoning, addresses the 
question: are there new modes of regulation in this economic sector and if 
so, are there new actors besides the traditional employer – employees – state 
IR triangle? As we conclude so, our example supports our wider case but is 
not generalized at this early state; it will be added to a bank of examples that 
feeds the work towards theoretical renewal of IR.
THE ACTOR CONCEPT IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
SYSTEMS
Bellemare (2000) put forward the first analytical and operationalized 
definition of an actor in industrial relations. Previously, this concept had 
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seemed to have an essentially accurate and sufficient definition imbedded 
within itself, making any analytical operationalization seem irrelevant. In 
both the systemic (Dunlop, 1958) and the strategic models (Kochan, Katz, 
and McKersie, 1986), only three actors were recognized in IR: workers 
and their unions, employers and their associations, and government 
organizations, whose function is to assist the first two actors in their 
relations.
However, there have been more pressing calls since the mid-1990s 
for a broader concept of the IR actor, especially one that would reflect 
social movements; thus, Collins (2006), Piore (1995) and Dabscheck 
(1994) appealed for inclusion of interest groups such as women, the 
disabled, ethnic minorities, homosexuals, and others into the study of IR. 
Practitioners in the field, whether unions or employers’ associations, had 
long been striving to take these groups into account (Briskin, 2006) and did 
not wait for the renewal of the theoretical models to include them. Since 
the 2000s, authors such as Kochan (2000), Hyman (2004), Edwards (2005) 
and the ones gathered in the BJIR (2006), have promoted the inclusion of 
the study of the relations of IR system actors with local communities and 
national and international social movements, which in our view means 
that it is necessary to take into account the fluctuating boundaries of IR 
systems instead of promoting static analytical models. In Québec, there 
have been cases of intra-union interest groups fighting for equity and for 
the respect of fundamental labour rights in relation to gender or age in 
collective agreements negotiated by their unions (Brunelle, 2002; Legault, 
2005a). In the North American tradition of industrial relations, the main 
way to approach this kind of situation was through the intra-party attitudinal 
structuration in the theory of collective bargaining (for example, Walton 
and McKersie, 1995). Yet, in the latter cases, we have to account for the 
fact that some groups in a unionized context rely on the support of extra-
union organizations (in these cases, feminist and human rights groups) to 
defend their cause at work, bringing non-union actors into the field and, 
moreover, bringing judicial authorities other than labour judicial bodies 
into the field. More than a problem in aggregating members’ interests, we 
face a new step in the defence of rights at work, where unionized workers 
look beyond their union to defend their interests at work and against these 
same unions. These actions and actors come to have a direct effect in the 
working conditions in these unionized contexts, and this, not only without 
but despite the local union’s action.
After studying Quebec public transit user groups from 1975 to 2000, 
Bellemare (2000) demonstrated that these groups were actors in this IR 
system. Through persistent action, they exerted a durable influence on a 
new concept and production of public transit service, even becoming actors 
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in the co-production, co-design, and co-surveillance of service and work 
relationships and in the adoption of new labour laws. Using his empirical 
study, Bellemare proposed a structurationist definition of the actor as the 
foundation for an operationalized analytical framework of IR action. The 
concept of IR means the set of actors, rules, institutions, and subjects of 
the social relations of production in modernity and late modernity; these 
elements are defined in the following section. Action is the ability to 
modify one’s environment and to intentionally or unintentionally produce 
consequences through one’s behaviour (Bellemare, 2000: 385). Bellemare 
thus defined the IR system actor as an individual, group, or institution with 
the ability to influence, through its action, the direction of IR (direct action) 
or the actions of other IR actors (indirect action; Bellemare, 2000: 386). 
For example, unions do not have the power to legislate labour matters but 
they can influence the State through lobbying and get government to take 
action on their demands. In the resulting model (Figure 1), an actor not 
only must act in order to be recognized as an actor, but he must also have 
the ability to get other actors to take his aspirations into consideration and 
to respond favourably to some of them.
FIGURE 1
Flexible Actor Model of Industrial Relations
In the new analytical framework proposed, the traditional dichotomy 
between actors and non-actors in industrial relations is set aside in favour 
of the influence continuum resulting from the actions of individuals, groups, 
and institutions whose importance as IR actors varies in time and space. In 
the classical approaches, individuals and sub-groups of unions, for example, 
were not considered actors.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level 
(x pertinent social levels) 
Length Continuous Discontinuous 
Actor 
Individual 
Group 
Institution 
  Intensity of action 
Outcomes of action 
(Emancipation/life politics issues) 
Transformations 
Organizational 
Extra-national 
National 
Work-Site 
Major Minor 
Durable Temporary 
Number of affected action levels 
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Actors in a given IR system assume their role in multiple ways in 
an organization’s or a sector’s internal social relations as they influence 
the organization of work, the management of human resources, and the 
determination of working conditions. In various IR system dimensions, 
their action can vary in intensity (occasional or continuous), scope (limited 
to the organization or extended to include regulatory institutions), or 
outcome (lead to or impose large-scale durable transformation or remain 
circumscribed and prompt minor changes). This definition of actor has had 
productive applications in various national and international IR contexts;1 
its explanatory power is not limited to the B2BTSC sector, of course. We 
here limit the study to this particular empirical case.
In our study, clients and project teams in B2BTSC are IR actors, if, 
by their action, they can directly or indirectly influence the direction of IR 
or HR policy or the actions of other IR actors. We will show that they act 
on an intra-enterprise and inter-enterprise basis (work-site, organizational), 
on all aspects of the work relations (co-production, co-conception and 
co-surveillance), with a continuous action that has major and durable impact 
on the working conditions of these workers
Three specific details must be added to this definition. First, as Abbot 
(2006) has shown, when he has used Bellemare’ framework, it is not fully 
essential for the actor to have an action at all levels and at every moment 
to exert an impact on the definition of work conditions or of frontiers of 
the IR system.
Second, this definition of actor, grounded in the structuration theory 
of Giddens (1984), itself grounded in the critical realist epistemology of 
Bhaskar (1975, see Edwards, 2005), poses that the definition of who is and 
is not an IR actor is context sensitive or space-time sensitive: one can be an 
actor in a particular case and not in another case. For example, Bellemare 
(2000) has identified the user groups in the case of the Montreal city transit 
system as actors between 1975 and 2000, but this was probably not the 
case in the Gatineau transit system at the same period. It is the conceptual 
and analytical definition that has a good generalization potential, not the 
empirical new actors that can be identified with it.
 1. This concept was used by Bellemare and Ackéyi (1999) in their analysis of the role of 
actors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Gabon, and was 
afterward applied to an organization of miners’ wives in Australia (Jones, 2002), and 
to European Union experts in the implementation of national industrial relations policy 
(Baldacchino, 2001). It was used by Michelson (2006) in relation to the role of chaplains 
in Australian businesses, by Bell (2006) on the same topic in England, by Abbott (2006) 
in relation to the role of citizen advisory boards that advise non-unionized employees 
on problems in the workplace, and by Peltonen (2006) in relation to the status of the 
multinational in the industrial relations system. 
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Third, in this definition of the actor, the traditional IR actors: union, 
employers and state agencies, because they are the most directly involved 
in the work relation will undoubtedly always be identified as actors. The 
most relevant question in this case becomes to what extent do they have an 
impact on the particular IR system in which they intervene? The answer is 
more empirical-analytical than based on an a priori basis. For example, it 
is probable that the soviet unions in the 1960’s were IR actors in Russia, 
but did they have the same type of impact that Canadian unions had at the 
same time, considering that the Russian unions were subservient to the 
communist party?
The IR system model proposed by Jones and Bellemare (2005) 
considerably expands upon the concept of the outcomes of the IR system 
(Figure 1, in italics). In traditional models, they are summed up by collective
agreements, organizational performance, and by the number of strikes and 
grievances. In the new model, new and old actors are given the power to 
produce results in the form of new modes of regulation and new social 
relations parties.
THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF THE IR SYSTEM
Beginning in the 1940s, IR theories essentially adopted a Fordist 
perspective as they designed the employment relationship around the 
control of wage earners by contracts of undetermined length, and legal 
subordination. The form of the firm is changing, however, into a post-
bureaucracy, post-Taylorist, network-firm (Briand and Bellemare, 2005, 
2006; Legault, 2005b). New forms are giving rise to a multitude of employee 
statuses. The organizational entity relevant to IR is not necessarily the legal 
organization-employer structure. An entire stream of research is developing 
around the view of the firm’s boundaries as being porous and movable 
and the consequences arising from these conditions for management and 
HRM practices, such as boundaryless careers (Arthur and Rousseau, 1996; 
Fleming and Spicer, 2004; Heracleous, 2004).
In this study, the actions of clients and project teams as IR actors are 
observed as they relate to the organization of work and the institution 
(political decision making in the organization). From the sociology of work 
we learn that the distribution of work requires coordination and is possible 
only if the organization of work is conceived, executed and, of course, 
supervised. However, these tasks have assumed new forms that emerged 
since Taylorism. The study of these two groups will show how they fulfill 
the role of co-producers, co-supervisors, and co-designers of the service 
and therefore become major players in this particular IR system.
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The concept of co-production suggests that the action of a goods 
or service user intentionally or unintentionally influences the manner, 
effectiveness, and outcome of a service. Actors to various degrees may seek 
this co-production and be more or less controlled while doing so. The user or 
client is a co-producer in the service sector, to degrees that vary according to 
the service’s level of sophistication. In the restaurant industry, for example, 
this stakeholder acts less efficiently than in the consulting industry.
Similarly, the receiver of the service may be a co-supervisor of the work 
(while at times being supervised himself), both in an individual capacity (by 
making complaints, for example) and as part of a group, by participating 
in pressure groups or setting up and implementing various supervisory 
specifications internally (grievance committees, user committees, board of 
directors) and externally (creating a system to gather user complaints, or 
users obtaining legal recourse before the courts).
Lastly, the receiver of the service may be a co-designer of that product 
or service and could thus interfere with the standards and prescriptions of the 
company’s management by requesting another product or delivery method. 
For example, the receivers may be invited individually, collectively, during 
discussion groups, or as representatives of user groups to help define their 
needs and the products and production methods, and to evaluate the quality 
of products or services. The more the service is complex, the need imprecise, 
and the anticipated result unforeseen, the more the receiver’s involvement is 
requested. Receivers may also volunteer their own participation, and lobby 
individually or collectively for a greater role as co-developers of a product. 
This is what the feminist movement did in the health sector in the 1970s, 
at a time when women decided to no longer allow the mostly male medical 
profession to dictate their needs and the type of care for their situation. 
Similarly, public transit user groups have made similar demands.
METHOD
We used the following sample of five organizations of the new economy 
and two traditional large bureaucracies to make our comparisons:
• Three small B2BTS businesses (IT-1, IT-2, and IT-3);
• Two businesses that develop optics and telecommunications products 
(Optics I and Optics 2);
• Two bureaucracies:
 – The IT department of an insurance company (Insurance-I),
 – The IT department of a real estate management company (Real 
Estate).
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The organizations in the first group had between 100 and 150 employees, 
while those in the second group had between 500 and 1,000. None of the 
employees in any of the groups were unionized. Data were collected on a wide 
range of topics regarding story of the organization, HR policies in general and 
towards WLB in particular, work content of individuals and detailed work 
organization, including lengthy accounts of project management.
For most of their activities, all the organizations keep a constant flow 
of communication with clients and use the management by project method. 
In keeping with widespread current trends, the IT departments in the two 
bureaucracies had been organized into independent centres providing service 
to the entire organization, with instructions to deliver service with optimal 
returns. As such, they competed with external firms and were in danger of 
being abolished if their competitors were cheaper and management used 
their services instead. Although the bureaucracies’ IT departments were 
studied for comparative purposes, they organized work in the same manner 
even though they operated in different organizational contexts.
A total of 88 respondents participated in the survey (43 men and
45 women) between January 2001 and April 2002. In each organization, we 
interviewed one or two human resource managers, two to four immediate 
supervisors (project managers, team managers)—usually a man and a 
woman—and 10 to 12 employees (equal numbers of men and women) 
working in computer or software engineering, often as qualified engineers 
but not always, the recruiting strategies varying much and being part of the 
clue in these organizations. The in-depth interviews lasted one and a half 
to two hours, and the interview guide was semi-structured. Documentary 
information regarding the seven sites was collected as well. Many questions 
were asked as standard procedure to everyone, so simple descriptive statistics 
can be summed up, though the study was qualitative. Data were analyzed 
with the grounded theory procedure and NVIVO software program. Only 
part of the categories, relevant to our question, will be accounted for here; 
many other publications quoted here account for the rest of the study.
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF WORKPLACE REGULATION
Based on our observations of the B2BTS firms in our study, we suggest 
that the client and the peer team helped establish the production framework 
in the organization, and, in many ways, became a substitute for the human 
resources department.
Project Management as a Form of Work Organization
The five SMEs dealt with numerous external clients. The clients of the 
two bureaucracies’ IT departments were the departments of the same firm, 
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and all of them used a common work organization method that can be briefly 
described as follows. Each project was a binding contract under which the 
supplier-organization usually provided the client-firm with a deliverable 
(computer product such as software) and also a service (technical support, 
maintenance, customer service). To produce the good, a team was built 
around a project manager. These teams were multifunctional, relatively 
autonomous, temporary, and constituted according to the client’s needs 
(Alvesson, 1995; DeFillippi, 2003, Legault, 2004). Although short-lived, 
the teams had to produce goods or services to be delivered on a date and
at prices established by a succession of contracts with several clients. At
the term of each project, the team was dissolved and the professionals 
thus freed up were drafted into another team to work on new pending 
projects.
In a post-Fordist context, these much sought-after professionals have 
careers that are called boundaryless; that is to say that these careers are 
characterized by frequent short term contracts for different employers, 
instead of a stable employment relation (Arthur and Rousseau, 1996). 
They are very mobile on the job market, which itself strongly encourages 
their mobility. The concept of employee loyalty, long held as a major 
indicator of employee commitment, is replaced in this industry by a desire 
to agree to anything to satisfy a client within the scope of a project. The 
commitment thus expected is intense, but not necessarily long term. Neither 
the professional nor the employer views a long employment relationship as 
a priority (Legault, 2004; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2000).
The professionals interviewed in the WLB research were assigned to 
the production of services but rarely involved in the negotiation of contracts 
in which budgets and deadlines are set, even though they were the ones to 
comply to the extent possible with its conditions. Yet budget conditions and 
deadlines are the key issues in risk: if too restrictive, they could lead to the 
failure of the project, and the professionals and the project managers hold 
the primary responsibility for the project’s success or failure. Therefore, the 
pressure should have been greater in the five SMEs (which have external 
clients) than in the two bureaucracies, but that is not the case: at Insurance-I, 
whose clients were other departments in the same firm, pressure came from 
within because the department had become an independent for-profit centre. 
At Real Estate, the requirements of clients and the pervasive possibility that 
they might go with a competitor exposed the professionals to the same type 
of pressure that is found in other project management scenarios.
We can already see that this situation sets the client in a key position to 
establish the framework for certain—highly important—working conditions, 
as the client draws up budget and deadlines in a context of fierce competition 
that spares him/her a large freedom of maneuver. And yet, this in return 
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determines how many people the firm can assign to the project and the 
working schedules.
Human Resources Departments, a Background Presence
The clients did not limit their influence to occasional marginal 
transformations of existing industrial relations practices but actually 
established the organization’s framework for in-house production and 
wielded numerous decision-making powers that in other environments 
are normally assigned to the human resources (HR) department. In three 
out of the five SMEs in our sample, the HR department had been created 
shortly before our visit. As well, in the firms that had a more structured 
human resources department (two SMEs and the two bureaucracies), the 
department was not involved in the employee-project manager relationship 
(Legault, 2004).
The HR department played a negligible role in the decisions that 
normally are within their mandate elsewhere, in hiring matters as well as 
in issues of vacations, holidays and schedules. The following extracts are 
particularly eloquent:
[Translation] Well, some of them…when someone leaves the team, it’s usually 
not [the employer’s] decision. (Oh, to that extent?) Yeah, he [the client] has 
the last word. The client decides who gets on the team and who goes: “I’m not 
happy with him, he has to go.” “Yeah, but wait, let’s talk to him first.” ... Then 
it happened that he decided: “That guy goes! We don’t want him anymore. 
That’s final; he’s rude on the phone…” so they said, “No, we don’t want him 
anymore.” So then they [the department] warn him ahead of time: “So in one 
month, you’re gone, you’re, like, going to another project and you’re leaving 
that team, it’s because of the client.” (CGF-1-18-27-8-01-19-3)
Because in our field, the client makes the decisions about a lot of people. For 
example, when we want a vacation, “Alright, but…we have to check to see if 
it’s o.k. with the client.” (MF-3-22-28-3-01-19-3).
When assigned to establish working conditions such as the professionals’ 
hours, work schedules, or telecommuting, the project manager made highly 
variable decisions, essentially based on the client’s wishes.
In these situations, the principal functions of the HR department were to:
• Ensure that the firm complies with the main public labour laws;
• Manage the application of its benefits (pensions, if applicable, 
vacations and holidays, and so forth);
• Provide the other departments with the workers needed for their 
operations;
• Apply sanctions and execute lay-offs or dismissals upon request.
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In this particular context, far from witnessing anomie we see the 
emergence of new sources of regulation taking the place of Fordist 
regulations in the bureaucratic environment (collective agreements, internal 
regulations and procedures, and labour laws). Among others, the client and 
the peer team emerge as major actors. At the heart of all the management 
decisions of the organizations under study, and in all matters, particularly 
HR, WLB, work organization, and telecommuting (Legault and Chasserio, 
2003), were the clients’ imperatives (tight contract deadlines, pressing 
need for the product), followed by the concerns of the team, whose second 
imperative, loyalty, was subordinated to the client’s needs (each worker had 
particular skills and had to be present in case he was needed, under peril of 
delaying product delivery).
Here we can see that the client is no longer outside, talking the managers 
into his/her liabilities, but in fact, inside the firm, managing the project’s 
staff in many daily decisions, getting the project manager into relaying his/
her decisions. At the work-site level, (s)he is continuously involved (high 
intensity of action, see figure 1) and entails major transformations in the 
internal politics of HRM, as we will see, in a durable way.
CLIENTS AND TEAMS AS CO-PRODUCERS 
AND CO-DESIGNERS OF THE GOOD/SERVICE
Clients: Spectators No Longer
These two roles are examined in the same section because the 
conception and production of a good or service by technology firms are so 
tightly intertwined in B2BTS firms that it would be redundant to separate 
these functions for analytical purposes, as was done in Bellemare’s (2000) 
study of public transit users.
Unlike plant workers, these B2BTS professionals interact constantly 
with clients because the products requested are sophisticated, customized, 
and complex to make. The client becomes involved to ensure that the 
product is adaptable to the type of data to be processed, to the information 
system currently in place at the client’s business, and to its users, and so 
forth. Moreover, the order changes constantly as the development cycle goes 
on. Regardless of the content of the initial contract, the client withdraws 
or adds details to the order during product development when informed 
by the developer of limits and constraints that challenge the initial order, 
and also of possibilities of which he had been previously unaware. This 
situation excludes any rigid operational planning from the outset, and 
forces developers to make accommodations for the conflict between the 
contract’s budget and deadline requirements on the one hand, and the 
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client’s constantly evolving demands, additions, and quality expectations 
on the other.
As the producers were qualified to hold productive discussions with 
the client because of their hermetic knowledge and the specialized nature 
of the order, management transferred the role of transacting with the client 
during production to them. A major part of their work involved diplomacy 
(Legault, 2005b). The project managers were not the client’s exclusive 
contact, and the professionals were often called upon to work at the client’s 
temporarily.
Professionals must take into account the client’s requirements from 
the outset of product development, and keep up with changes in these 
requirements and in production deadlines, produce and deliver the finished 
good to the client within the set time, and then provide post-production 
service. The producer has scant bona fide powers of negotiation because 
contracts are made in a highly competitive market that gives clients the 
lion’s share of the power (Anderson-Gough, Grey and Robson, 2000).
Thus the members of a team responsible for implementing software in 
three months, for example, had to resolve these conflicts on a daily basis 
and make logistical decisions that invariably had a determinant impact on 
the project’s success or failure. For instance, they had to consider whether it 
was better to sacrifice one test phase in order to adhere to a deadline and thus 
risk producing a product with bugs, or else put quality first by taking their 
time and risk testing the client’s patience before product delivery (Berrebi-
Hoffmann, 2002) In the face of such sizeable risks, the optimal solution 
was often to attempt to do it all, which resulted in unlimited overtime and 
a tremendous amount of commitment from the employees. To adhere to 
the established price, it was necessary to lower production costs, of which 
the main element was manpower. Thus unlimited work hours without 
compensation for overtime became a major asset.
The client did not limit his contribution to the effectiveness of the 
service simply by being compliant or influencing the production process 
by sharing his concerns with management, but was placed at the very heart 
of the production process. Clients were active at every phase, negotiating 
each step with the producer. For their part, the producers had to keep the 
clients informed of obstacles and/or new possibilities that occur during 
production. It was the client’s specific orders, rather than a product offer 
determined by a group of managers, that triggered the beginning of the 
production process. The resulting operations did nothing but reinforce the 
influence of the client, who led the service supplier rather than subordinate 
himself to him. The client and the professional were not on an equal footing 
in terms of competencies, but the competitive market confers an undeniable 
edge on the party that requests the service.
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Let’s make it clear here that the professionals are still salaried employees 
of their firms, in all seven sites; this strong influence of the client doesn’t 
appear anywhere in the juridical structure and remains informal, though 
very powerful due to two important factors: fierce competition and a close 
supervising relation with the professionals. This influence is not buffered 
by the management; on the contrary, the responsibility for the client’s 
satisfaction in all his/her requirements is conveyed to the professional, 
whose assessment will rest mostly on that same satisfaction.
Here we can see client and professionals in a strong working 
relationship, because of their direct negotiating relationship and, mostly, 
because of the direct influence of client requirements on the production 
process. This, in turn, has a direct influence on working conditions, that is 
to say working time in this particular case, as we will see. This is a major 
and durable outcome of the continuous client action on working conditions 
at work-site level (see figure 1).
Disapproval of Shorter Work Schedules
In these B2BTSC, where there is hardly any formalized HRM, there are 
few policies or official rules for scheduling or for workplace organization. 
In all the companies visited, only one had a work time policy, and its 
application was left to the discretion of the project manager and the client. 
Shorter work schedules were usually denied, particularly in the case of 
part-time work and telecommuting arrangements (Legault and Chasserio, 
2003).
Shorter work hours were often frowned upon. One of the female project 
managers we interviewed shared this:
[Translation] When I have people on a four-day workweek, I think they’re not 
ambitious [...]! [...] We have so much work, we push our people, the projects 
aren’t easy, you know… Yet there are people who work four days a week… 
like the saying goes, it’s a bad fit [...] The company does offer it, I’m happy 
for those people, but on the other hand, you look at them and you might not 
feel like having them on your team. When you have a really urgent project… 
(ASF-3-3-11-7-01-19-3)
In short, the obstacles to work organization that lead to the denial 
of part-time hours and that were usually invoked to justify the need to 
agree to overtime are the client’s needs, the needs of the work team, the 
interaction that was required among team members, and the importance 
of each member’s unique qualifications to a highly specialized and skilled 
production process. The obstacles that were expressed could be understood 
only in light of the contrast between the volume of work and the human and 
financial resources needed to execute the contracts (Legault and Chasserio, 
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2003). Both management and employees (not equally, since the men agreed 
with the needs more than the women did) mentioned these requirements as 
the basis for their disapproval of reduced working hours.
These qualified technology workers reported more often to the client 
and to their own teams and were more often subject to their authority than 
to that of their own project manager. Our respondents’ highest priority 
was their own reputation; therefore, they were likely to give the client 
the required flexibility and availability. Reputation is built, approved, 
and changed by the drafting decisions of project managers and clients, 
and it is the number one placement asset in a highly mobile job market 
(Berrebi-Hoffmann, 2002, Courpasson, 2000). The regulatory framework 
extends to the entire draft pool in which each professional covets a place. 
As the professionals are highly mobile, the client’s action level is not just 
organizational; it’s also local, if not national.
The main argument against shorter hours that was freely given was that 
clients do not have part-time needs but rather continuous requirements:
[Translation] It’s part of the game. Yeah. Yeah. A consultant who does 9 to 5, 
I’m convinced that he won’t be a consultant for long. Because there are all types 
of situations that require our availability…There can be a last–minute situation 
that makes it necessary to, well, you know…I’ll give you an example; in my 
division we had a product to make in two days, so there was a chance we had 
to work both nights until midnight to be able to deliver. So that’s a lot…You 
have to be flexible in these cases. Yeah. (CGSH-10-4-12-10-01-19-3)
Again in this case, the client dictated to the project manager how 
working hours should be managed, for example, by refusing to work 
with professionals on the team who requested shorter hours. For its 
part, management dictated work hours by leaving the implementation of 
scheduling and overtime compensation policies to the discretion of the 
project managers, who are first and foremost dedicated to the client.
In short, what we see here is a client directly conveying his/her orders 
regarding work time to the project manager or directly to the professional, 
in absence of any intervention coming from the HR department, even when 
the firm has some policies regarding part-time work or overtime billing. 
The client can directly transform HR local policies on working time in a 
major (calling off their application) and durable way (in many projects 
throughout time; see figure 1).
The Regulatory Role of the Project Team in the Co-Design 
Production Phase
Shorter work hours and work organization also collided with a second 
consideration: the team itself. The work could not progress unless team 
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members were constantly interacting. No one was afraid to say: “When one 
team member is missing, the work of the rest of the team is delayed,” or 
that a part-time schedule was unsuitable for managers or professionals, who 
have unique qualifications and might be needed at any given moment.
In the same vein, in denying the opportunity to telecommute, team 
managers offered that the frequent exchanges among team members were 
a priority that required everyone’s co-presence, and that the unique skills of 
team members meant that someone’s absence could delay the whole team. 
Naturally, the client’s requirements concerning the presence and availability 
of the employees on their project underpinned all these comments, either 
because the team members provided customer support, the client wanted 
to be able to talk to them at any time, or the employee worked at the 
client’s during the duration of the project and the client wanted him to be 
present.
On this subject, a female manager at IT-3 said:
The employees won’t draw up their schedules without taking the others’ into 
consideration, and they also have to get the project leader’s agreement. (DDF-
7-7-6-3-01-19-3)
The group that supplied the unlimited effort expected would not 
approve any exceptions for a team member because the rest of the group 
would have to make additional efforts to compensate for their absence, and 
the performance of the team is evaluated as a whole. On the other hand, a 
worker who saw that his freedoms had negative consequences for the client 
or that they burdened his co-workers would not impose such compromises 
on his work environment. The social sanctions of team members are to be 
feared because these colleagues have the power to make recommendations 
to future clients and therefore to influence a professional’s reputation. To 
preserve reputation, the professional imposed all compromises upon the 
family (Legault and Chasserio, 2003).
We can only observe that the team is collectively driven by the 
client’s imperatives in the same way professionals are; moreover, small 
arrangements among professionals in a team are hindered by the pressure 
imposed on them as a group.
THE CLIENT AS HUMAN RESOURCES CO-SUPERVISOR
Vanishing Control and Double-Edged Autonomy
Although ostensibly autonomous within their firms, these employees 
had lost most of their control over the way they organize work. Given that 
the HR department does not intervene in the relationships between project 
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managers and employees and gave the former a great deal of latitude 
(Chasserio and Legault, 2005), the client is unchecked in his dealings with 
project managers and the professionals because his role is not described 
in the official organization chart and the challenge of satisfying the 
client is part of a consensus that is not formally monitored. Reputation 
becomes a driving force of self-discipline. Indeed, in respondents’ own 
terms, boundaryless careers and management by project turn workers 
into “consultants” (according to their own terms) within the organization 
that employs them. Indeed, many respondents, still salaried employees 
at their employer’s, had a consultant status at the client’s that “borrows” 
them through a service contract agreement (while being bound to their 
own employer by an employment contract) for the duration of the project. 
Whether dispatched to the clients’ or working at their own employer’s, the 
workers interacted constantly with the client, in contrast to suppliers of 
manufactured goods in an industrial setting, for instance.
Within our sample, autonomy was viewed equally as a prized working 
condition and a work requirement that came with heavy responsibility. 
Seventy-six respondents (76%) said that they were autonomous in their 
work, i.e., in the way they organized their tasks and carried out projects, 
but also said that the project manager monitored compliance with deadlines 
and budgets. Only 9% said they had very little autonomy. The professionals 
also had a great deal of operational autonomy in deciding how to make 
the product, in their interaction with the client, and in the organization 
of their work, a condition they value because it allows them to express 
their creativity. When asked what their employer considered the most 
important quality of an ideal employee and which asset was required of 
them, autonomy was number one on the list.
Autonomy is not only a bestowed advantage but also a requirement of 
the profession that carries heavy obligations and is received in exchange 
for a commitment to satisfy the client. As projects frequently overlap, 
employees juggle heavy parallel demands and establish the order of 
priorities themselves in the case of conflicting tasks, while possibly facing 
reprimands for the decisions they make. Instructions such as “Do whatever 
it takes to meet this deadline”, or “Here’s the objective, make sure you meet 
it” are inputs into autonomous decision making that foster more stress than 
professional satisfaction (Legault and Belarbi-Basbous, 2006). When faced 
with a problem, our respondents quickly realized that they could always 
be held accountable because of the latitude they were given to establish 
operational methods and priorities.
The quest for customer satisfaction is a powerful instrument of control 
as it is the main issue in the crucial evaluation process (Anderson-Gough, 
Grey and Robson, 2000; Courpasson, 2000; Legault and Chasserio, 2003). 
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One observes a noticeable—and inexpensive—regulating effect in the 
constant internal competition among professionals, either among project 
managers or the members of their team, who were seeking for a good 
position in the next drafting process within their own firm or in another 
firm in the short or medium term, or a position as project manager or 
else simply the maintenance of their own reputation. We must notice that 
autonomy is, in fact, a way to convey to the professionals the responsibility 
of negotiating with the client and to make them entrepreneurs eager to 
build their reputation. In the process, clients’ needs are prevailing as first 
determinants of clients’ satisfaction and conditions of work as well.
We must notice here that neither the project manager nor the HRM 
department has any supervising role; self-censorship of the professional can 
be relied upon, as they are in an entrepreneurial relationship with the client, 
eager to have him/her satisfied in order to keep a spotless portfolio.
The Client and the Organization of Work: Long Hours and 
Overtime Management
In most of the organizations visited, there was no provision governing 
the professionals’ compensation for overtime. Sometimes overtime was 
paid at the same rate as regular work, or the employee was given time off 
equivalent to the rate of his normal pay, or equivalent to time and a half 
or double time. In other cases, overtime was unpaid and the employee was 
not given time off. The many hours of overtime that professionals did were 
rarely, if ever, paid (Legault and Chasserio, 2003). While not a universal 
practice, it was nevertheless a widespread policy to withhold compensation 
for overtime except in the case of hourly workers and to consider the 
compensation of professionals, which is calculated at an annual rate, as a 
lump sum that is not tied to a specific number of work hours, despite the 
fact that professionals often put in long overtime hours.
It was the project manager’s responsibility to estimate the number of 
vacation hours to offer as compensation for overtime, but overtime was not 
necessarily accounted for in an official document. The granting of time off 
for working overtime depended on an informal agreement with the current 
project manager and could be compromised at any time, depending on the 
client’s needs, particularly in relation to budgets and deadlines. The project 
manager determined the threshold that had to be reached before offering 
compensation for accumulated overtime. It was reported that IT-1 issued 
a moratorium on paying overtime rates. This was justified by budget cuts 
and the fact that “the client no longer wished it.”
In the organizations we studied, the official work week ranged from 
35 hours (Real Estate and IT-3), to 37.5 hours (Insurance-I, IT-2, and 
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Optics-2) or 40 hours (Optics-1 and IT-1). The following table describes the 
distribution of the real hours that respondents consistently, not occasionally, 
put in throughout the year.2
TABLE 1
Real Work Hours by Gender
Hours worked per week Women (n = 45) Men (n = 43)
Adherence to the hours stipulated in the work contract 18 (40%).  7 (16.3%)
35- to 39-hour work week including overtime  6 (13%).
40- to 49-hour work week including overtime 18 (40%). 26 (60%).1
50- to 59-hour work week including overtime  3 (6.6%)  9 (21%).1
60+ hour work week including overtime 0 1
Long work hours are characteristic of work organization in the B2BTS 
industry (Hellens, Nielsen and Trauth, 2001) and of the knowledge economy 
(Alvesson, 2000; Bailyn, 1993; Evetts, 1998; Perlow, 1999; Simpson, 
1998; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2000). Work hours are one of the factors for 
measuring employee commitment in this sector, which in turn is a major 
factor in determining who receives a promotion. Employees are judged on 
their “presenteeism,” or the many overtime hours they willingly agree to 
do (Bailyn, 1993: 79).
To illustrate, here is a quote from a project leader with Insurance-I 
who very clearly articulated the commitment she expected from her 
employees:
[Translation] I expect an employee to give his all…in terms of productivity. 
Yes, he can enjoy his work and continue to learn … […] even find personal 
satisfaction in it, but he should give his best. After all, we’re professionals, 
we’re well paid, so I expect that those people, when they’re at work, give the 
most they can. (ASF-3-3-11-7-01-19-3)
The employees were encouraged to give the “necessary time” rather 
than a fixed number of hours to their work.
We must not see this autonomy in assessing what the “necessary time” 
is as the freedom to determine it; in this assessing process, the clients’ needs 
are prevailing and the respondents’ discourse on this topic is obvious. In all 
this, the client’s action is continuous, major (as in turning down an overtime 
compensation policy) and durable, not an exception.
2. There were wide gaps between the men and the women, which are discussed elsewhere 
(Chasserio and Legault, 2005). 
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CLIENT AND TEAM AS ACTORS OF REGULATION
Entrepreneurial Discourse and Consensus Perception
The customer service attitude expressed as entrepreneurial discourse 
was evident in the respondents’ remarks, despite the fact that they were 
salaried workers. For example, when asked about how they viewed work 
and success, their priorities were customer satisfaction, being useful 
and solving the customer’s problems, and respecting the deadlines and 
the agreed-upon budget. Other dimensions of professional success were 
secondary, such as job satisfaction, continuous learning, and satisfying the 
boss’s requirements. Thus, the concept of commitment among professionals 
had shifted substantially from loyalty to one’s employer to temporary but 
total loyalty to the client (Anderson-Gough, Grey and Robson, 2000; Singh 
and Vinnicombe, 2000).
Did this make the client and the team actors in the industrial relations 
system? Yes it did, at least from one significant standpoint. These actors 
did no less than relieve the employer of his regulatory role and unburden 
him from the inevitable tensions created by the conflicting interests of 
capital and work, the effect of which was to make these work environments 
high-consensus organizations. The professionals asserted that individual 
performance ensured the organization’s competitive position on the market, 
and consequently, the client’s satisfaction secured their own jobs (Singh 
and Vinnicombe, 2000). They integrated this constraint so thoroughly that 
their perception could be equated with a shared interest with the leadership 
of their organization. Bending to the clients’ very high demands is due to 
globalization and generates stress that respondents viewed as resulting from 
the client’s power, not the employer’s:
[Translation] Yes, we evaluate all the tasks to be done, the schedule for doing 
them (...). In 90% of cases, the client wants it done in half the time. So we end 
up sort of compressing the length of time that would have been more ideal. 
So our people who manage projects feel the stress because they’re handed a 
project that doesn’t give them much latitude with the deadlines. (DSF-13-1-
23-8-01-19-3)
Among salaried workers, this situation can only be explained by the 
mobility of experts in a post-Fordist salaried work market where loyalty to 
one employer no longer makes sense. The professional considers himself/
herself all the more autonomous because the demand is constant. The 
organization is just one of the places where professionals belong, and they 
have multiple loyalties, including to their clients (Alvesson, 2000; Robertson 
and Swan, 2003). In this context, boundaryless careers are an additional 
factor in the production and reproduction of the mode of regulation of the 
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work begun under the client’s control. However, boundaryless careers 
establish themselves within a labour-regulating framework in which power 
relations are asymmetrical.
Levels and Modes of Labour Regulation
At this stage, the client’s action had a determinant effect, either directly, 
for example by demanding that a particular worker be assigned to or released 
from a project, or when evaluating individuals, the project manager or the 
team, and so forth, or indirectly, by co-constructing the product or service 
with the requirement that the sub-contracted company adapt to his own 
deadlines and schedules, and so forth. This direct action is far different from 
the indirect client’s action on the manufacturing organization, for instance; 
in that latter case, the client has an indirect action in deciding to patronize 
or not, at most negotiating prizes.
The team, for its part, required the co-presence of all its members and 
a uniform level of contribution to the collective effort. While the sociology 
of work has often documented the regulatory role of the work group to 
counter the mounting requirements of management (Bendix, 1974; Reynaud, 
1988; Sayles, 1958), we find the opposite situation here because the work 
team helped intensify the work, whether it was paid or not. For salaried 
workers, their job was on the line in the medium term. The team, just as 
much as the project manager, was capable of marginalizing a professional, 
of keeping him from participating in projects that might be gratifying in 
terms of money, learning, and reputation, and, most of all, of reducing his 
employability by tarnishing his reputation.
For the professional, the boundaries of the firm he works for are a 
limited regulatory framework on two fronts. First, the current client is 
a major actor of this regulation, so the regulation space far exceeds the 
legal boundaries of the direct company/employer. This regulation takes 
precedence over the national legal framework, which is loosely followed 
(additional hours can be refused under section 59.0.1 of the Act respecting 
labour standards, but this provision has no effect in this environment. 
A salaried worker may well refuse to work, but his reputation would be 
tarnished. The same holds true for parental leave or personal leave for 
family matters, and so forth). Second, reputation is at the heart of the sector-
based regulation of professional work in this industry. It is the object of a 
co-construction among the actors involved in the project over the short term, 
and among the actors of the sector, at least regionally, over the medium 
term. To build a reputation (or to lose it), one must, in fact, work or have 
worked on more than one project and for more than one client. Therefore, 
each of the worker’s decisions feeds into this company/short-term and 
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sector-based/long-term co-construction of the regulation of labour, and these 
two time-space contexts of labour regulation are articulated or interrelated 
at local as well as international level (see figure 1).
CONCLUSION
A study of a fairly evenly distributed (by gender) sample of
88 professionals in B2BTSC companies identified the regulatory practices 
that call into question not only the traditional terms of Fordist regulation, 
which until very recently dominated bureaucracies that employ B2BTS 
professionals, but also the traditional boundaries of the IR system from two 
perspectives: that of the three principal actors—the employers, the workers 
and the State—through the addition of clients and work teams, and the 
separation of the IR system’s contexts from the IR system itself.
The clients had various means at their disposal, and their actions had 
undeniable scope, continuity, as well as undeniable results. There was no 
longer the question of changes brought about by the clients’ action because 
the clients’ influence actually gave rise to an all-encompassing method of 
organizing work. Clearly, this outcome was related to the client’s action—
his commands were given and they were obeyed by the employees, the 
teams, the project leaders, and management, which approved the contract’s 
stipulations in response to conditions the client imposed.
This particular case, as that of the public transit users documented 
by Bellemare (2000), shows that what may be traditionally considered a 
contextual dimension of the IR system must sometimes be analyzed as the 
emergence of new actors in IR. Through their action, these actors influenced 
the social relations of work directly as well as indirectly.
This case also shows that inter-organizational relations are one of the 
issues in social relations. Historically they were analyzed through categories 
such as mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances, but the emergence 
of what some call the post-bureaucracy organization or the network 
organization appears to have given a new meaning to this issue. As a topic 
of research, this relationship mode shifts the subject of inter-organizational 
power relations from legal forms of property and contracts to the negotiation 
of the organization’s regulatory boundaries. Organizations positioned poorly 
in this relationship of power witness the invasion of the boundaries of their 
service company, as in the cases studied in this research, while others 
safeguard their boundaries better (Swart and Kinnie, 2003), in accordance 
with our context sensitive definition of actors and IR systems.
These observations do not necessarily mean that the client is usually or 
frequently an actor in the IR system. The eventual standardization of products 
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offered by B2BTS companies in a context of supplier oligopolization might 
allow them to reverse this inter-organizational power relationship and open 
up new ways to regulate labour relations.
This case study, and the other studies that used Bellemare’s (2000) 
analytical framework of the IR actor, confirm the need to develop a new 
theory of labour relations within a dynamic rather than a static framework 
that has varying geometries. The various attempts to escape Fordist (or 
Keynesian) regulation in an era of increasing globalization are an incentive 
to observe the transformation of the boundaries of the IR system.
The results presented here about emergent modes of regulation suggest 
that there is a need for future research to further explores the issue of the 
various space-time contexts of the regulation of work, which are sometimes 
complementary and sometimes in opposition, and also to look at modes 
of regulation. Some of our results show that formal legal regulations are 
not necessarily the most important and that other modes of regulation, for 
example, those that are based on reputation, may be very effective.
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RÉSUMÉ
Enjeux théoriques liés aux acteurs et aux modes de régulation 
émergents
Dans le contexte d’une grande transformation de l’économie mondiale, 
on constate de plus en plus l’inadéquation des efforts de théorisation
des relations du travail qui datent du fordisme, notamment du modèle 
d’analyse systémique (Dunlop, 1958) comme du modèle stratégique 
(Kochan, Katz et McKersie, 1986), en vertu duquel trois acteurs se partagent 
exclusivement la scène de l’action, c’est-à-dire les syndicats, les employeurs 
et l’État, dont les interactions se déroulent essentiellement dans le cadre 
de l’État-nation.
De ce contexte où émergent de nouveaux acteurs dont le poids 
n’est pas négligeable en relations du travail, les entreprises de services 
technologiques aux entreprises fournissent un bon exemple, car elles sont 
très exposées à la concurrence internationale en concourant à la fois sur 
un marché du produit et du travail international. De ce fait, on y observe 
de nouveaux modes de régulation émergents qui, à leur tour, illustrent la 
nécessité d’intégrer de nouveaux acteurs et de nouveaux enjeux aux modèles 
théoriques du système de relations industrielles, si on veut rendre compte 
de sa complexité contemporaine. Pour démontrer la présence d’acteurs tout 
aussi importants que méconnus dans les relations du travail de ce secteur, 
les auteurs reprennent la définition de l’acteur en relations industrielles de 
Bellemare (2000) et ses conséquences sur la définition des frontières des 
systèmes de relations industrielles.
Une enquête a été menée auprès de 88 professionnels de l’informatique 
des entreprises de services technologiques aux entreprises, dans une 
population composée à parts égales d’hommes et de femmes. Elle a permis 
d’y relever des pratiques de régulation qui non seulement remettent en cause 
les termes traditionnels de la régulation fordiste qui, hier encore, dominaient 
les bureaucraties professionnelles où on employait les professionnels de 
l’informatique, mais encore les frontières traditionnelles du système de 
relations industrielles selon deux aspects. Le premier aspect concerne les 
trois acteurs principaux: les employeurs, les travailleurs et l’État, par l’ajout 
du client et des équipes de travail. Le second a trait à la séparation entre les 
contextes du système de relations industrielles et ce système lui-même.
Les moyens du client sont nombreux, son action a une portée, une 
continuité ou constance, ainsi que des résultats indéniables. On ne parle plus 
de changements obtenus par son action, car c’est un mode d’organisation du 
travail entier qui émerge sous son influence. Ces résultats sont clairement 
liés à son action : il commande et on obéit, tant les employés que les équipes, 
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les chefs de projet, et la direction qui approuve la teneur des contrats aux 
conditions posées par le client.
Ce cas, comme celui des usagers du transport en commun urbain 
documenté par Bellemare (2000), montre que ce qui aurait traditionnellement 
été considéré comme une variable exogène du contexte du système de 
relations industrielles doit parfois être analysé comme l’émergence de 
nouveaux acteurs en relations industrielles et que le système, au lieu d’être 
déterminé par un marché exogène est en fait pénétré de l’intérieur par 
celui-ci dans certaines situations. Par leur action, ces acteurs influent tant 
directement qu’indirectement les rapports sociaux du travail.
Ce cas illustre aussi que les rapports interentreprises sont l’un des 
enjeux de ces rapports sociaux. Historiquement, ces rapports interentreprises 
s’analysaient avec des catégories telles que les fusions, les acquisitions, les 
alliances stratégiques, etc. Le développement de ce que certains appellent 
l’entreprise post-bureaucratique ou l’entreprise en réseau semble poser 
en termes nouveaux la question des relations interentreprises. À titre de 
piste de recherche, ce mode de relation déplace l’objet des rapports de 
force interentreprises des formes juridiques de propriété et de contrats 
aux négociations des frontières sociales, ou informelles, des entreprises. 
Certaines, mal placées dans cette relation de pouvoir, voient envahir les 
frontières de leur entreprise prestataire de service, comme dans les cas 
étudiés ici, alors que d’autres préservent mieux les leurs. L’enjeu ici est la 
réduction des coûts ou une plus grande protection contre les risques de la 
relation contractuelle dans le cadre de produits et services peu uniformisés 
a priori.
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